> I doubt that a typical smartphone actually infringes on 10,000 patents held by outside entities, or that 10,000 separate entities each hold one of those patents apiece
10,000 is probably in the ballpark. People have no recognition of how incredibly complicated phones are today. They're obviously not owned by that many separate entities, but that doesn't really help much. It takes about the same amount of time to determine whether a device infringes the claims of a patent regardless of whether the same patent holder also holds other patents. The "savings" come when you stop looking at the claims and start paying royalties based on the quantity of patents the patent holder claims you're infringing, but that's where the incentive to get low-quality patents comes from.
> if filing fees are set so as to cover the entire costs of the court and system, and the system has a fairly inelastic capacity (supply), the increased demand for services would cause the filing fees to rise. Presumably an equilibrium would be reached where only those with large and realistic claims would bother to file, whereas those with low quality patents would be priced out.
The counterargument you're going to get there is that you'll price small inventors out of the patent system.
> Ideally the system could always afford to look closely, because it's self-funding. It wouldn't necessarily need to be adversarial, either -- it could be more like arbitration, where you file, paying the court to evaluate your claim, and the court makes a decision. No need for lawyers, unless you need help putting your claim together.
But you're still not solving the pricing issue. What objective metric is an arbitrator supposed to use to evaluate the value of a patent?
10,000 is probably in the ballpark. People have no recognition of how incredibly complicated phones are today. They're obviously not owned by that many separate entities, but that doesn't really help much. It takes about the same amount of time to determine whether a device infringes the claims of a patent regardless of whether the same patent holder also holds other patents. The "savings" come when you stop looking at the claims and start paying royalties based on the quantity of patents the patent holder claims you're infringing, but that's where the incentive to get low-quality patents comes from.
> if filing fees are set so as to cover the entire costs of the court and system, and the system has a fairly inelastic capacity (supply), the increased demand for services would cause the filing fees to rise. Presumably an equilibrium would be reached where only those with large and realistic claims would bother to file, whereas those with low quality patents would be priced out.
The counterargument you're going to get there is that you'll price small inventors out of the patent system.
> Ideally the system could always afford to look closely, because it's self-funding. It wouldn't necessarily need to be adversarial, either -- it could be more like arbitration, where you file, paying the court to evaluate your claim, and the court makes a decision. No need for lawyers, unless you need help putting your claim together.
But you're still not solving the pricing issue. What objective metric is an arbitrator supposed to use to evaluate the value of a patent?